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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we demonstrate that it is possible to automatically
generate fingerprints for various web server types using multifactor
Bayesian inference on randomly selected servers on the Internet,
without building an a priori catalog of server features or behav-
iors. This makes it possible to conclusively study web server dis-
tribution without relying on reported (and variable) version strings.
We gather data by sending a collection of specialized requests to
110,000 live web servers. Using only the server response codes,
we then train an algorithm to successfully predict server types in-
dependently of the server version string. In the process, we note
several distinguishing features of current web infrastructure.
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the fundamental tactics used by both attackers and defend-
ers is to understand what specific systems might be under attack
or require defense. Individual point releases will have known soft-
ware bugs for which off-the-shelf exploits may already be avail-
able. [7] While web servers often need to know a browser’s spe-
cific user agent, e.g., to deliver content that works around known
bugs or missing features of a given web client, web clients have no
particular reason to know the exact version of a web server. This
leads to a common mitigation, where a web server administrator
will deliberately obfuscate version strings. When a server gives
commodore64-HTTPD/1.1 or ’; DROP TABLE server-
types; - as its version string, this behavior is obvious, but it
is difficult to measure the frequency at which such modifications
occur, or the true types of servers with obfuscated names.
Historically, extensive work has been done on fingerprinting oper-
ating system kernels [3], and traffic classification [11], often mak-
ing use of probabilistic techniques [15], and on fingerprinting web
browser configurations [21], among other areas. While various
commercial applications use known distinguishing features of dif-
ferent web servers to identify server types and versions [16], sur-
prisingly little academic work has been conducted on the topic of
web server fingerprinting, and much of what has been done has
focused on detecting or preventing fingerprinting [20].
In our research, rather than manually cataloging every possible
quirk, we wish to take a machine learning approach, sending a vari-
ety of carefully crafted requests to large numbers of web servers on
the Internet, and training our system to make subsequent identifi-
cations. We take advantage of the fact that many installations don’t
obfuscate their published version information, allowing us to train
our models with remarkable accuracy.
2. DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Our central design principle was to determine if variations in web
server behavior made it possible to determine server type (e.g. Apache)
and version (e.g. 2.2.3) without a manual analysis of individual
pieces of software. We undertook to do this by surveying a broad
selection of running web servers and comparing their responses to
various requests. In the process, we gathered information on some
behaviors and features that might be related to potential exploits
either against either the servers themselves or against browsers ac-
cessing the servers.
The HTTP Protocol. Knowledge of the HTTP protocol is nec-
essary to understand web server behavior and variations. First doc-
umented with version 0.9 in 1991, the HTTP protocol is now stan-
dardized on version 1.1, released by the Internet Engineering Task
Force in its RFC 2068 of January 1997 [5], and updated with RFC
2616 in June of 1999 [6]. While the basic format of the protocol is
relatively straightforward, there is significant opportunity for differ-
ent implementations of the protocol to behave differently, particu-
larly in selecting among the 41 different response codes included in
the protocol. Furthermore, many request and response headers are
optional, and their ordering is not specified by the protocol. This
means that different server implementations will have measurably
different behavior that can be used for the purpose of classification,
even when the question of incomplete and incorrect implementa-
tions is set aside. These variations, described in part below, make it
possible to identify server types and versions by the various ways
the protocol is implemented.
In designing our experimental methodology, it was essential not to
compromise or damage any of the servers that we studied. There-
fore we chose a selection of correct, if somewhat unusual, HTTP
requests, and analyzed the responses. We chose requests that would
enable us to gather identifying information about the servers — not
simply the basic HTTP version string that nominally represents the
server type and version, but also a set of responses that should en-
able the identification of the server based on its behavior, and not
only on its reported type. In designing our experimental methodol-
ogy, we also sought to obtain aggregate data about large numbers
of servers, as opposed to a detailed understanding of the security
profile of a few selected sites, and so we chose an approach that in-
volved crawling a large number of sites and cataloging responses,
rather than a manual inspection of a few hosts.
2.1 Bayesian Classification
Bayes’ rule is a basic principle of probability that allows one to cal-
culate the probability of a given hypothesis given a certain datum,
when one knows the correlation between the datum and the hy-
pothesized conclusion in the universe being considered. Consider
the common application of spam filtering, where Bayesian classi-
fication has been found to be extremely effective, even in the face
of dedicated attempts to defeat it [1]. If one considers the pres-
ence of a certain term in an e-mail as the datum in question, as well
as the frequency of that term in both spam and non-spam e-mails,
then Bayes’ rule makes it possible to classify the probability that a
given e-mail is spam based on the presence of that term. Bayesian
inference allows multiple observations of this type to be combined,
potentially allowing for more accurate classification of the e-mail
as spam or not. Bayesian techniques have been used effectively for
intrusion detection [12], data mining [4], and as an effective tech-
nique in fields well beyond the scope of computer science [8].
Our application is somewhat more complex than spam filtering, as
we need to classify servers as belonging to one of many categories
of types, and not simply as a binary quantity (spam or not spam.)
In doing so, we use Bayes’ rule to calculate the probability of a
given server belonging to each server type, and choose the type
with the highest probability. (See Section 2.4) This also enables
us to associate a degree of certainty with our predictions, as we
know the likelihood that our observed characteristics belong to our
calculated server type [9].
2.2 Selection of Requests
In developing our experimental methodology, we selected 10 sep-
arate requests to send to every surveyed server. A summary of the
requests and their purposes is shown in Table 1. While we begin
with a standard HTTP GET to provide a baseline, the other re-
quests are intended to identify features that may have different (or
missing) implementations across different web servers. They were
also chosen with the aim of receiving the same response regardless
of site configuration. Thus, the only files that we access directly
are files that should be present on most servers: the root URL, the
robots.txt file, and the favicon.ico file. While these files
may not be present on every server, their presence on most servers
enables a broad comparison across sites independent of site con-
tent.
2.3 Datasets
We prepared three distinct data sets. The first consisted of re-
sponses from the Alexa top 10,000 sites, the second consisted of re-
sponses from the top 100,000, and the third consisted of responses
from the last 10,000 sites in the Alexa top 1 million. These three
data sets, representing a total of 1.2 million HTTP requests and re-
sponses, allowed us to abstract behavior for different server types,
and to compare the differences between the largest (and presum-
ably most carefully maintained) sites and other sites that are likely
not as actively maintained or uniquely configured.
2.4 Prediction of Server Types
Our work sought to provide a methodology to identify server types
beyond their self reported version strings. With this in mind, we
Request Rationale
An ordinary get request
against the root URL
This request provided a “baseline.” As
the most ordinary request that any server
would receive, we expected it to be han-
dled in a straightforward manner with a
200 response code.
A partial get request of 50
bytes against the root URL
This request allowed us to test the
server’s implementation of the HTTP
partial get feature.
A conditional get request
for pages modified after a
future date against the root
URL
This request allowed us to test the
server’s implementation of the HTTP
conditional get feature.
A head request against the
root URL
This request allowed us to test the
server’s implementation of the HTTP
head feature.
An options request This request allowed us to test the
server’s implementation of the HTTP
options feature.
A trace request against the
root URL
This request allowed us to test the
server’s implementation of the HTTP
trace feature.
A request for the root URL
as a CSS stylesheet
This request is similar to a request that
might be generated by a browser expe-
riencing a cross site scripting attack. A
modern browser should watch the con-
tent type of the response, refusing to in-
terpret the page as CSS if it is labeled as
HTML.
A request for robots.txt as
a CSS stylesheet
Similar to the previous request, it allows
us to test mime type support on a differ-
ent file type (text).
A request for a relative
URL above the root direc-
tory
This request is invalid and should be re-
jected on any server. If it were hon-
ored, it would give the client access to
the server’s entire file system.
A request for the favicon This request allows us to survey another
content type, again checking for proper
MIME type support.
Table 1: Requests used in measuring server behavior
collected the server response codes from the requests above, and
used them to calculate a distinct fingerprint for each type of web
server. We could then match the responses of an unknown web
server against the fingerprints that we had developed for various
server types, enabling us to predict its type and version.
We associated the individual fingerprints with specific server types
and versions by using the version string provided with the responses.
In doing so, we did not assume that the data in the version string
was necessarily correct. Indeed, our premise was that it is often
changed to report something other than the correct server type and
version. However, we did assume that, as these changes are made
by individual administrators acting independently, that there would
not be a consistent incorrect server string for a given fingerprint. In
this way, the incorrect responses, even if they constituted a signifi-
cant percentage of the sample, could be filtered out as noise, while
the single largest reported version string for any given fingerprint
would be, in fact, the correct one.
Our fingerprints took the form of a dataset listing the frequency of
each response for each server type and request type. We generated
the fingerprint dataset by training on the raw data in our primary
dataset, calculating the probability of a given server version given
that server’s response to our requests using a standard Bayesian
methodology, as discussed in Section 2.1:
P (response|server) = P (response∩server)
P (server)
Then, for each server in the set being tested, we sought to predict
the probability of each server type. Assuming that the response
to one request was independent from the response to a different
request, we used Bayes’ rule to combine the probabilities for each
request for each server type as follows:
P
(
server|
⋂n
i=0 responsei
)
=
P
P (server)
∏
P (responsei|server)
P (server)
∏
P (responsei|server)+P (server)
∏
P (responsei|server)
This gave us a probability for each server type given the total set
of responses any given site returned. We then selected the most
probable server type as our prediction, reporting both the server
type and the probability that we had generated.
2.5 Limitations
Some attempts at disguising a server’s type and version may go be-
yond changing the version string. For example, a program called
ServerMask by Port 80 Software changes the format of headers,
cookies, and file extensions to make Microsoft IIS resemble a dif-
ferent type of server. Because our techniques do not use those
particular markers to fingerprint the server, those changes should
not affect our success. However, software that manipulated the
response codes could easily confuse our algorithm. Indeed, it is
possible that some of the unusual response codes that we detected
came from software seeking to do exactly that. Additionally, our
methodology assumes that a single web address corresponds to a
single server technology (which may or may not be distributed
across multiple physical machines). However, in cases where dif-
ferent requests are handled by different server technologies (as may
happen, for example, when separate caching servers are used) our
attempts at identifying a single server technology used on the site
can, at best, identify only one of the technologies used.
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Figure 1: Confidence levels for servers whose reported type dif-
fered from the calculated one. (top 10k servers based on train-
ing data from top 100k)
3. RESULTS
Having developed our techniques, we applied them to our data set,
enabling us to validate our methods and discover several interesting
behaviors of current web servers.
3.1 Distribution of Server Types
In order to determine the effectiveness of our technique, it was nec-
essary to test it on real world data. In doing so, we gathered infor-
mation on server type from raw version strings, processed it with
our algorithms, and examined the results.
3.1.1 Reported server types
While the HTTP standard provides for the use of “Product Tokens”
(section 3.8) in the “Server” field of the response header (section
14.38) [6], many individual sites choose to modify their headers to
exclude this information or replace it with irrelevant or incorrect
data. Thus, we found server versions such as Nintendo, All
your base are belong to us, and My Arse in addition
to more standard strings such as Apache/2.2.20 (Ubuntu).
This penchant for customization not only reflects the universal hu-
man desire for self-expression, but an understandable desire to hide
sensitive information from potential attackers and competitors. The
reported server types which we observed are summarized in Ta-
ble 2.
3.1.2 Calculated server types
In order to correct for this behavior, we developed an algorithm
(described above) that used multifactor bayesian analysis to predict
the actual server type based on responses. Our algorithm produced
different results from the server type returned by the site for ap-
proximately 38% of sites. Figure 1 shows the confidence levels of
our predictions when our algorithm was trained on the top 100,000
sites, and run on the top 10,000 sites.
While for a number of servers, we were able to predict the server
version with a very high confidence level, in other cases, it is not
immediately clear whether the server was reporting incorrect data,
or whether our algorithm incorrectly predicted the type of the server.
As it was infeasible to contact the administrators of all servers in
the sample to inquire as to the true server version, we relied upon
the confidence levels produced by the Bayesian analysis. Even be-
yond this, however, some circumstantial evidence does suggest that
our algorithm correctly predicted the results in many cases.
Apart from the fact that our analysis produced the same results as
the server version string in 62% of cases, some of the divergent
results also suggest correct behavior. For example, server versions
which are derived from Apache, such as IBM HTTP Server and
Apache Coyote, were recognized as Apache, even though they did
not figure into the training data for Apache. Most sites with unusual
and obviously false version strings were recognized as belonging to
one of the major server types.
A more interesting question concerns the cases where servers with
apparently correct version strings were recognized as servers of a
different type. Are these cases of web site administrators seeking to
intentionally obfuscate their server selection, or cases of erroneous
behavior on the part of our software? As seen above, we were able
to generate a confidence estimate for each of our predictions, and
many of these results fell in the 75% confidence range, suggesting a
likelihood that we were frequently correct, and the reported version
strings represented an intentional effort at obfuscation.
3.1.3 Sites reporting multiple server types
One phenomenon that affected our analysis was the case of a num-
ber of sites that reported different server versions to different re-
quests. Within the top 100,000 websites, we found that 6 servers
gave 10 different version strings to our 10 requests, 84 gave 5 or
more, and an astounding 24,254 sites gave at least two different
server versions. One example is Verizon.com, which alternately re-
ported itself to be running Apache, Microsoft-IIS, Oracle-iPlanet-
Web-Server (the successor to Netscape Enterprise Server), Aka-
maiGHost, or returned no version string at all!
While we have no direct evidence explaining this phenomenon, our
data does suggest several possible conclusions. For example, a
number of servers reported no server version at all, until they were
asked for their favicon.ico, at which time they reported that they
were running Microsoft-IIS. This suggested to us that a bug or con-
figuration error in Microsoft-IIS revealed the server version on that
particular request when an operator had desired for it to be hidden.
On other sites, it would appear that our requests were, indeed, being
handled by a variety of servers of different types. It would seem
that some common requests may have gone to a server handling
static content, while the more unusual requests got forwarded to a
different server which, in turn, returned a different server string.
The caching software used by Akamai Global Host, in particular,
seemed to produce this phenomenon.
It is conceivable that some web servers were configured to return
different version strings to different requests, perhaps in an effort
to confuse observers. However, we have no conclusive evidence to
support this hypothesis.
3.1.4 Server Types
After running our analysis, we were able to classify the most com-
mon web servers found in our data set. The results are shown in
Table 2. We give both the reported server types and the calculated
server types for comparison. As can be seen, the 15% of servers
which did not report a version have all been classified into one of
the major versions.
Many servers are re-classified as Apache, bringing the relatively
low number of Apache servers found in the top 10,000 sites up to
a level more typical of the internet as a whole. Because we assign
all servers to the most likely category, even when our confidence
in our estimates are low, this may result in various obscure server
versions being classified as Apache with a low confidence rating.
As the most common server type, Apache becomes the “best guess”
when no good classification is possible.
Additionally, the number of servers reporting Microsoft-IIS can be
seen to have increased. This is consistent with the known existence
of software designed to obscure Microsoft-IIS servers. More inter-
esting is the virtual disappearance of Microsoft-HTTPAPI servers.
The Microsoft HTTP API is designed to let programs written in C
service HTTP requests for specific URLs. It is a relatively low-level
API, exposing basic HTTP functionality to the programmer. While
there is no definitive way of knowing whether our re-classification
of Microsoft HTTP API version strings was correct or not, it is
worth noting that Microsoft HTTP API is not so much a server
type as it is an interface for various programs to function as a web
server. Thus, it seems likely that there is limited commonality be-
tween the way different programs making use of this API handled
our requests. It may be the case that, because each program using
this API is effectively a unique server type, that our algorithm was
unable to effectively classify them.
Of the three smaller server versions, AkamiaGHost, cloudflare-
nginx, and LiteSpeed, two are not server types at all, but content
delivery networks. CloudFlare and Akamai specialize in hosting
static content in locations close to users, enabling faster page re-
trieval. For this reason, it is not surprising that their servers should
be re-classified as one of the common types — their server version
strings represent a delivery network and not a version type. Lite-
Speed, on the other hand, is a proprietary server technology. While
it advertises itself as being “completely Apache interchangeable,”
[13] LiteSpeed does not advertise itself as being an Apache deriva-
tive. The general classification of LiteSpeed servers as Apache may
reflect similarities in the behavior of the two servers as well as Lite-
Speed’s small market share.
3.1.5 Apache Versions
In addition to the server type, the software version is an interesting
topic of study. It provides information as to how up-to-date a server
is, an interesting question both for study and for potential attackers.
For this reason, we set out to see what information we could extract
from our dataset regarding server versions.
Most servers in our dataset did not disclose their exact version, but
a sufficient number provided the information to make some analy-
sis possible. Because Apache servers possessed the largest market
share — and hence, the most complete data — we chose to study
their version strings in order to get a better understanding of the
server population in active use. Although we have not studied other
server types in the same detail, we expect these results to be simi-
lar to Apache derivatives and that the results can be generalized to
other servers.
Our first step in studying the distribution of Apache servers was
simply to examine the version strings returned by the servers them-
selves. As is shown in Appendix B, the version numbers of Apache
servers in active use vary widely. While many are recent versions
such as 2.2.22 and 2.2.23 (both 2012 releases) some servers use
Apache versions dating from the late 1990s and early 2000s. In-
deed, more than 10,000 responses of the 963,000 received from
the top 100,000 sites reported some version of Apache 1.3, which
Server Type Top 100k (Raw) Top 10k (Raw) Top 10k(Corrected) Bottom 10k (Raw)
Apache 40.7% 29.6% 59.6% 52.8%
Nginx 12.8% 16.1% 17.6% 8.2%
Microsoft-IIS 12.7% 9.5% 12.7% 12.9%
Not Reported 12.3% 15.5% None 9.1%
Microsoft-HTTPAPI 6.3% 5.2% 0.1% 5.3%
AkamaiGHost 2.6% 6.4% None 0.2%
Cloudflare-Nginx 1.5% 0.9% None 0.9%
LiteSpeed 1.5% 0.8% None 1.2%
Table 2: Prevalence of server types based on raw version strings and calculated values.
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Figure 2: Release year for Apache software currently in use
reached its end of life in 2010, although patches are still produced.
Server version strings, like server types, are subject to the caprice
of site maintainers, who have an incentive to report incorrect in-
formation in an attempt at security by obscurity. Not only did
slightly more than half of the servers reporting themselves as run-
ning Apache give no version details at all, but in the remainder,
a few obviously false version strings such as “4.0.4” and “6.6.6”
were returned. However, it is unclear how many of the plausible
version strings are in fact false.
Using the same probabilistic techniques that we used to predict
server types, we attempted to predict server versions. First, we
took all of the servers that reported their server type as Apache, and
trained our algorithm based on their reported versions from the top
100k. We then applied the trained algorithm to the smaller data sets,
seeking to predict the version for servers reporting Apache. Unfor-
tunately, the responses received from our queries did not meaning-
fully differentiate Apache versions. It is possible that variations
among Apache versions might enable a researcher to determine
Apache versions sending different requests or by measuring dif-
ferent properties in HTTP responses, but we leave this to future
work.
3.1.6 Comparison with others’ results
One way to estimate the accuracy of our results is to compare them
against other sources. Netcraft gives results for “all domains” —
more than 625 million domains. They report the top servers as
Apache with 57.2%, Microsoft with 16.5%, nginx with 11.9%, and
Google with 3.4% [17]. These results are largely consonant with
our findings, although the scale of the Netcraft survey is obviously
much broader, and so the results can not be directly compared.
In a similar survey of 63.5 million servers, Security Space reports
Apache with 68.7%, Microsoft with 14.89%, and Other (presum-
ably including nginx) with 16.17% of the market [18]. While the
results are largely consistent, we did not have access to the method-
ology for these two surveys, so we were unable to determine if they
were naively relying on server version strings, or using some more
sophisticated method of identifying server software.
3.2 Server Responses
In analyzing our data, we found that web servers returned 44 differ-
ent response codes, many of which do not form part of the official
HTTP specification. The table in Appendix A illustrates the range
of responses for our various requests. Some of these responses
are particularly noteworthy. For example, when we request text
and HTML documents as CSS, only a relatively small percentage
of servers return code 406, indicating that the document can not
be returned given the parameters sent by the client. Interestingly
enough, the number of servers returning the response varied de-
pending on the request. When we asked for a text file as CSS,
9,338 servers gave us a 406 error, while only 3,229 gave us that
error when we asked for an HTML document as CSS. Much more
common is code 200, sending the document despite the unusual re-
quest. While this response is perfectly compliant with the HTTP
standard, which provides for the return of documents in a different
type if the requested type is not available, it may be a less wise re-
sponse from a security perspective, as the request suggests a cross
site scripting attack is in progress, and the attacker is looking for
access to user data from that page.
Most servers correctly returned an error (400 — bad request, 403
— not authorized, or 404 — not found) to our request for a relative
URL. However, the 4,759 servers that returned a 200 code were not
mostly servers exposing a security vulnerability. Instead, they were
mostly configured to return a standard page for any malformed re-
quest - not a strict interpretation of the HTTP standard, but not an
immediate security risk. For some reason, a 405 (not allowed) re-
sponse was returned by nearly half the servers for our trace request,
rounding out the significant anomalies found in the version codes.
Unsupported Features. A number of the features used in our
requests seemed simply not to be supported by a majority of web
servers. For example, our conditional get, which asked for a page
only if it had been modified after a future date, only received the
expected 304 response from some 7,000 of the 97,000 responding
servers. The remainder simply served up the page, even though the
condition had clearly not been met. The actual 501 “Not Imple-
mented” response appeared relatively rarely, with 14,000 servers
returning it for our trace request, and 3,700 returning it for our op-
tions request.
3.3 Character Encoding
Not surprisingly, a wide variety of character sets were returned by
our servers, with UTF-8 being the most common, followed by ISO
8859-1 and windows-1251. A small portion of servers were
obviously misconfigured, returning an empty string or a string such
as $conf_pass->charset. We did not develop tests to see if
the charsets for the remaining servers matched the actual encoding
of the content, but it seems reasonable to assume that additional
misconfigurations exist in that space, as well.
More significant is the fact that more than one third of servers
(36,000 out of our 100,000) simply did not return a character en-
coding at all. While correct charset encoding is more important to
user experience than to security, several existing security vulnera-
bilities relate to incorrect or missing character encoding, indicating
this is a risk on some deployed servers [19].
3.4 MIME Types
Also interesting from a security perspective is the range of MIME
types received. While the responses to our standard GET request
were mostly the expected text/html, the responses to some our
other requests had more variety. Responses such as application/
java-archive and application/json for an HTML doc-
ument hinted at server misconfigurations. Significantly, 0.1% of
servers returned no MIME type at all, exposing themselves to ex-
ploits where an attacker crafts a site to cross-load resources as a
different MIME type, thus extracting data from a confidential doc-
ument.
3.5 XSS Vulnerabilities
One of the more curious MIME type handling behaviors that we
observed was found in a number of servers that generate the MIME
type for their response based not on the actual type of the file, but
on the type requested by the client. Indeed, 208 sites in the top
100k, mostly reporting Nginx as their server type, exhibited this
behavior. This is a potential vulnerability, as it opens clients to
cross site scripting attacks [10].
In a cross origin CSS attack, an HTML page with confidential in-
formation is loaded by a script running from an attacker’s site. If
certain short CSS sequences have been injected into the page, the
attacker is able to read portions of the secure page. Most browsers,
including Chrome, Safari, and Firefox, prevent this by refusing to
load files as CSS resources cross origin if they present a conflicting
MIME type. However, when asked for a HTML page as CSS, these
sites, including sites like kickstarter.com and causes.com which
handle sensitive data, report that the HTML page is, in fact, CSS,
potentially enabling this sort of attack against their users. While
browsers could protect themselves against these attacks by deter-
mining a document’s content type through analysis, this behavior
represents a significant weakness [2].
4. FUTURE WORK
Our results show that it is possible to gather significant data about a
web server and its vulnerabilities based on a few carefully selected
HTTP requests. However, there is much room available for fur-
ther work in refining this process. In particular, additional work is
needed to develop a library of requests that are particularly effec-
tive at gathering distinguishing information about a server and its
security vulnerabilities. Our requests were designed on the basis
of informed judgment, but systematic tests with a larger collection
of possible requests would likely result in a collection that allowed
greater accuracy in predicting server type and in detecting vulnera-
bilities.
Additionally, our analysis focused primarily on the response codes
and MIME types returned from the server. Further research could
investigate other details of the server’s response, perhaps finding
variations that enable better classification and analysis of the servers
studied. Furthermore, ongoing research could survey a broader se-
lection of servers, both less visited servers hosting sites for the gen-
eral public and the embedded servers found in so many devices.
While our work focused on web servers, and much similar work
has been done on general network traffic, there are a broad range
of additional Internet technologies where probabilistic techniques
could be used to yield a better understanding of software distribu-
tion, maintenance, and behavior. This presents many interesting
areas for ongoing study.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have demonstrated that it is possible to predict server type based
on server responses, even without a prior analysis of server be-
havior. This enables a more accurate classification of web server
types than would be possible using server version strings alone. It
also shows that attempts at security through obscurity by hiding
the server version do not provide effective protection to vulnera-
ble web servers. While we were not able to effectively calculate
server versions using the technique of analyzing response codes to
individual requests, there is no fundamental reason why similar,
but more precise, techniques might not also be able to differentiate
among versions.
Additionally, even our broad survey, not focused on any particu-
lar site or vulnerability, was able to reveal a number of potentially
serious configuration issues. This is despite the fact that we fo-
cused only on the most visited websites, which would presumably
be among the best maintained. Among the misconfigurations ob-
served were improper MIME type configurations that allow a doc-
ument to be served with no MIME type or with an incorrect type
based on the client’s request. Dated server software was also found
to be widely in use. The maintenance of a web site is, of course,
the responsibility of the site’s owner, but we hope that our research
may provide a minor stimulus to raising the profile of the dangers
caused by mis-configured server software.
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8. APPENDIX A: RESPONSES FROM SERVERS
Table 8 gives a listing of all of the response strings returned by the
top 100,000 servers to our various requests. As can be seen, most
of the responses cluster into a few expected categories, but there
are large numbers of outliers, including many version codes not
defined in the official standard. Even some official codes occurred
in surprising places. For example, the IETF defines response code
418 as being an appropriate response from a teapot when instructed
to brew coffee [14]. As none of our requests were related to the
preparation of hot beverages, it is safe to assume that this code was
being used outside of its defined scope.
Response
Code
Condit-
ional
Get
Get
FavIcon
Get
Relative
URL
Get Head
Get
HTML
as CSS
Options PartialGet Trace
Get text
as CSS
0 1
1 1
200 88,689 73,599 4,759 95,654 94,059 91,877 80,192 95,653 27,728 65,003
203 3
204 3 79 6 3 11 3 10 3 2 4
205 1 3 4 2
300 3 2
301 2 1 1 2 4 2 3 2 3 1
302 1 3 1 1 3 1 3
304 6,985 1 1
400 69 72 66,759 70 148 70 385 69 289 66
401 26 26 11 26 28 24 271 26 200 25
402 2
403 411 268 16,331 410 952 407 1,676 409 9,492 405
404 357 22,455 6,616 356 540 417 1,221 359 1,508 21,547
405 3 243 7,768 40,968 1
406 1 5 6 1 3 3,229 39 1 45 9,338
407 2 2
408 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 2
409 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
410 1 20 34 1 1 1 1 2 3 10
411 21
412 1
413 17
417 25
418 1
420 1
422 11
429 1 1 1 1
440 1
499 1
500 119 146 832 124 253 533 335 122 196 193
501 1 8 31 2 3,663 14,002
502 53 34 11 53 63 56 87 52 12 44
503 88 57 85 87 192 94 158 85 76 59
504 10 7 11 12 11 9 10 13 7 6
508 2 1 2 1 1 4 1 1 1 1
509 1 1 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
550 1 1
599 1
770 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
801 1 1 1
901 1
999 6 29
Totals 96,823 96,784 95,516 96,807 96,553 96,738 95,874 96,803 94,586 96,718
Figure 3: Server response codes from top 100,000 servers by request
9. APPENDIX B: APACHE VERSIONS
The following versions of Apache were reported by servers in the
Alexa top 100k. A string such as 2.X.X indicates that the server
only reported Apache 2, and so on.
Apache Version No. of SamplesReported Release Date
Apache/1.3.3 9 9-Oct-98
Apache/1.3.9 2 19-Aug-99
Apache/1.3.11 5 21-Jan-00
Apache/1.3.19 8 1-Mar-01
Apache/1.3.20 40 21-May-01
Apache/1.3.22 10 12-Oct-01
Apache/1.3.23 26 21-Jan-02
Apache/1.3.24 27 22-Mar-02
Apache/1.3.26 177 18-Jun-02
Apache/1.3.27 265 3-Oct-02
Apache/1.3.28 40 16-Jul-03
Apache/1.3.29 264 29-Oct-03
Apache/1.3.31 180 11-May-04
Apache/1.3.32 8 Not released
Apache/1.3.33 559 29-Oct-04
Apache/1.3.34 509 18-Oct-05
Apache/1.3.35 19 1-May-06
Apache/1.3.36 77 17-May-06
Apache/1.3.37 1,223 28-Jul-06
Apache/1.3.39 271 7-Sep-07
Apache/1.3.41 2,964 19-Jan-08
Apache/1.3.42 3,618 2-Feb-08 [EOL]
Apache/1.4.0 10 n/a
Apache/1.4.X 100 n/a
Apache/1.9.0 1 n/a
Apache/2.0.4 10 n/a
Apache/2.0.6 10 n/a
Apache/2.0.29 10 Not released
Apache/2.0.35 7 5-Apr-02
Apache/2.0.40 96 9-Aug-02
Apache/2.0.43 10 3-Oct-02
Apache/2.0.44 10 20-Jan-03
Apache/2.0.45 10 1-Apr-03
Apache/2.0.46 270 28-May-03
Apache/2.0.47 10 9-Jul-03
Apache/2.0.48 20 29-Oct-03
Apache/2.0.49 61 19-Mar-04
Apache/2.0.50 70 30-Jun-04
Apache/2.0.51 144 15-Sep-04
Apache/2.0.52 3,107 28-Sep-04
Apache/2.0.53 132 7-Feb-05
Apache/2.0.54 450 17-Apr-05
Apache/2.0.55 348 16-Oct-05
Apache/2.0.58 122 1-May-06
Apache/2.0.59 1,226 28-Jul-06
Apache/2.0.61 204 7-Sep-07
Apache/2.0.63 4,858 19-Jan-08
Apache/2.0.64 3,804 19-Oct-10
Apache/2.0.X 133 on or after March10, 2000
Apache/2.1.X 20 before December 1,2005
Apache Version No. of SamplesReported Release Date
Apache/2.2.0 892 1-Dec-05
Apache/2.2.1 10 Not released
Apache/2.2.2 214 1-May-06
Apache/2.2.3 41,012 28-Jul-06
Apache/2.2.4 927 9-Jan-07
Apache/2.2.6 1008 7-Sep-07
Apache/2.2.8 3,443 19-Jan-08
Apache/2.2.9 8,635 14-Jun-08
Apache/2.2.10 1,401 14-Oct-08
Apache/2.2.11 3,270 14-Dec-08
Apache/2.2.12 1,126 28-Jul-09
Apache/2.2.13 819 8-Aug-09
Apache/2.2.14 12,018 3-Oct-09
Apache/2.2.15 15,230 5-Mar-10
Apache/2.2.16 18,947 25-Jul-10
Apache/2.2.17 12,667 18-Oct-10
Apache/2.2.18 299 11-May-11
Apache/2.2.19 4,108 21-May-11
Apache/2.2.20 4,010 30-Aug-11
Apache/2.2.21 11,910 13-Sep-11
Apache/2.2.22 39,446 31-Jan-12
Apache/2.2.23 13,660 13-Sep-12
Apache/2.2.X 6,071 on or after Decem-ber 1, 2005
Apache/2.3.5 20 26-Jan-10
Apache/2.3.6 10 17-Jun-10
Apache/2.3.8 28 31-Aug-10
Apache/2.3.11 7 7-Mar-11
Apache/2.3.14 7 9-Aug-11
Apache/2.3.16 6 20-Dec-11
Apache/2.4.0 8 Not released
Apache/2.4.1 182 17-Feb-12
Apache/2.4.2 257 17-Apr-12
Apache/2.4.3 506 21-Aug-12
Apache/2.4.X 40 2012
Apache/2.X.X 10,891 on or after March10, 2000
# of samples re-
porting version: 238,508
